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Abstract:   
The concepts of potential output level and growth survived the 2008 crisis and are still 
widely used in economic policy debates. The paper discusses the theoretical foundations and 
empirical assessments of these concepts. Potential output may refer to different concepts, 
depending on the constraints taken into account. Potential output cannot be assessed 
without a complex macroeconomic analysis. The paper discusses recent empirical work on 
potential growth estimates, especially how they introduce a break in potential growth after 
the 2008 crisis, and how the methods used often justify pro-cyclical policies. For the future, 
the problem is not a slowdown in potential growth but the inability of developed economies, 
under globalisation constraints, to reach a full-employment growth. 
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1 Earlier versions of the paper were given at an internal seminar at OFCE, 16 March 2015, at the 12th 
EUROFRAME Conference: ‘Challenges for Europe 2050’, Vienna, 12 June 2015, and at the AIECE meeting, 
Brussels, 5 November 2015.  
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1. Introduction 
The concepts of potential output level and growth survived the crisis. They have been set in 
stone in the European Fiscal Compact (i.e. the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union), which refers to structural public 
balances and structural efforts, as evaluated by the European Commission. These estimates 
are derived almost directly from potential output estimates, in order to assess and to 
sanction national fiscal policies, in a rather strange combination of theoretical concept, 
empirical assessment, and technocratic validation of economic policy strategies. Thus, 
potential growth estimates for France (1 or 1.6 %?) enable to validate (or not) the 2015 
French budget. Thus, euro area member states (MS) are obliged to cut their structural deficit 
by at least 0.5 percent of GDP per year and to bring their structural deficits to balance in the 
medium-term (or at least to bring their structural deficit below 0.5% of GDP), the structural 
deficit being based on the European Commission evaluation. 
The potential growth concept is also very present in current economic policy debates:  did 
the 2008 crisis lower potential output so much in the euro MS that austerity policies are 
necessary? Is the euro area condemned to low growth in the years to come due to low 
potential growth, and hence should the priority be to strengthen potential growth rather 
than supporting effective growth? Is potential output really an effective binding constraint 
on the economy today?  
One may first recall that the European Commission, the OECD and the IMF are unable to 
assess potential output levels in real time, as can be seen from their successive releases: for 
example, the Commission revised its estimate of the French output gap for 2007, from -0.2% 
in 2008 to + 3.1% in 2014; of the Spanish output gap from -0.4 to +3.0%. The method used 
does not explain the output loss due to the crisis (except in a tautological way), and does not 
allow to say whether the loss is permanent or may be reversed. There is no clear definition 
and measure of potential output, if one considers that the working age population, its 
participation rate, skills, capital stock and labour productivity are not independent of the 
effective growth path. The cases of Spain and Greece show that there is no potential output 
path independently of the observed output path, of macroeconomic policy, of EU and EMU 
membership, of the financial crisis. There are statistical methods that allow to exhibit so-
called potential growth trajectories but there is no explanatory model which would justify a 
break in potential growth in 2008-09, unless one recognizes that this break comes from a 
break in growth itself which on the one hand raises the issue of its reversibility, and on the 
other hand, does not explain the inability of economic policy to maintain output close its 
pre-crisis so-called potential level. There are several definitions of potential output, 
depending on the constraints and time lags taken into account. Thus, potential output 
cannot be assessed without a comprehensive and complex macroeconomic analysis. A priori, 
no endogenous and automatic forces can bring output back to a potential level defined in an 
a-historical way.  
3 
 
Section 2 discusses from a theoretical viewpoint the concepts of potential growth and 
output as well as their use for short, medium or long-term economic policy. We analyse the 
constraints that the notion of potential output should aim to assess and measure (demand 
or supply constraints, permanent or temporary). Section 3 presents and discusses empirical 
works evaluating potential growth. We examine how these works deal with the 2008 crisis, 
and how they explain the slowdown in potential growth on this occasion. We show the limits 
and dangers of the methods used, which often lead to justify pro-cyclical policies. Section 4 
deals with the debate on future potential growth. We argue that the problem is not so much 
the risk of lower potential growth, than the inability of MS to implement an economic 
strategy allowing to reach a full-employment growth, accounting for constraints in terms of 
profitability and competitiveness that the current European strategy does not allow to 
overcome.  
2. What theoretical basis for potential growth? 2  
By definition, potential output is the maximum level of output that may be reached at a 
given point of time and maintained in the long term, without excessive tensions in the 
economy, in particular with no acceleration of inflation. The potential growth rate is the rate 
of growth of potential output. The output gap is the difference between actual output and 
potential output.  
When the output gap is strongly negative at the beginning of the period, growth may be 
significantly higher than potential growth for a long time period, and this leads the potential 
growth notion to be ambiguous, incorporating or not a possible catching up of the economy. 
It is not obvious to say which imbalances which should be taken into consideration: should 
the external deficit be taken into account? 
The potential output definition refers to a reachable output level. It therefore requires 
considering a hypothetical economic policy which would bring output back to its potential 
level, but in so doing potential output would be modified; this is a first ambiguity of the 
concept. 
These concepts have two theoretical backgrounds. For the Keynesians, potential growth 
refers to a growth path close to full-employment. Potential growth is constant, and the 
output gap can be large, signalling that a vigorous economic policy may be required. For 
neo-classical economists, potential growth is a trajectory compatible with supply constraints, 
accounting for the equilibrium unemployment rate (which may be high) and the effective 
capital stock. The output gap is usually low.  
Potential growth may refer to a hypothetical growth allowing the economy to be close to full 
employment. It may also refer, from a normative point of view, to the objective of macro-
                                                          
2 We develop here analyses initially presented in Hervé Le Bihan, Henri Sterdyniak and Philippine Cour (1997): 
« La notion de croissance potentielle a-t-elle un sens ?», Economie internationale. 
4 
 
economic stabilisation policy. Potential growth may also refer to a regular trend, around 
which effective output fluctuates and which serves as a basis for assessing the fiscal impulse 
and public finances sustainability. It may not be necessarily relevant to use a single concept 
of potential growth for all three approaches. For instance, a country with deteriorated 
competitiveness may be obliged to accept high unemployment for a while, and therefore 
output below its potential level according to the first definition. But the fiscal effort 
assessment should however be done using the third definition.   
Potential output is not an observable variable. Its assessment is based on a large number of 
statistical assumptions and theoretical definitions. Potential growth is a subjective and 
questionable concept: maximum growth without (judged) excessive imbalances, resulting 
from supply constraints as opposed to a demand-driven effective growth. This concept 
makes sense in a specific theoretical framework: the Keynesian model with an amended 
Phillips curve. But the concept makes hardly any sense in real business cycle models where 
output is always at the optimum level and where inflation is determined by monetary policy 
expectations.   
Besides, what imbalances may be acceptable? Should one only consider only production 
factors availability and inflation developments? The potential growth notion becomes 
unclear if the economy suffers from a capital constraint, strong inflation (at least, above the 
monetary authorities’ objective), deteriorated competitiveness, excessive government 
deficits (at least, here also, as compared to the announced target), from inadequate income 
distribution. Potential growth can then be set only within a certain economic model, 
accounting for given imbalances, and a given economic policy strategy.  
Potential output may be estimated ex-post, for a past time period, but should it then be 
dependent on what happened after this time period? This is the case if the method used 
requires that on average output equals potential output. The question is: is the return to the 
reference path automatic (but through which mechanism?), or the result of economic policy 
or is it an artefact (potential output is calculated ex post as an average of actual output)?  
Potential output may be projected for the future, but how to take into account economic 
policy choices? Is there a single potential growth or does it result from social choices, for 
instance in terms of working time, female participation in the labour market, or retirement 
age? 
At time t, where tY  is effective output, the potential output level, * ( , , , )t t t t iY f t X Z Y −=  will 
be evaluated such that: 1 1( *)t t t t tY Yπ π β ε− −= + − + . X represents exogenous variables (like 
working age population, but the latter depends on immigration, hence on production); Z 
represents institutional or structural economic policy parameters which may possibly change 
(such as the retirement age). This raises several issues: 
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– One cannot estimate potential output without estimating its determinants. It is necessary 
to examine to what extent the latter are exogenous, to what extent they are affected by 
cyclical developments, to what extent they may or may not be changed by structural of 
cyclical economic policies measures. Let us consider a country where the older workers’ 
employment rate is particularly low.  It is not relevant to make huge efforts to increase this 
rate in a situation of mass unemployment. But if the country comes close to full 
employment, it may decide to introduce measures to increase this rate. How should this be 
taken into account in the potential output estimate?  
– There is no evidence that β in the equation is stable. On the contrary, the kinked supply 
curve theory tells us that β is strong when the output gap is positive or close to zero, but 
becomes nil when the output gap is large. In such conditions, the naive econometrician will 
find that the output gap does not vary and therefore that potential production follows 
actual production.  
– When the output gap is strongly negative, it is difficult to assess potential output; In 
addition, it makes little sense insofar as the alleged potential output will increase in line 
with economic recovery; 
– One needs to explain why economic policy is unable to maintain output at its potential 
level: either the gap between potential and actual levels is a white noise, or there are 
obstacles to a full-employment economic policy and, in this case, one must choose to 
account or not for these obstacles when estimating potential output. Let us consider, for 
example, the case of a country where at t=0, inflation is high, competitiveness is 
deteriorated, the profit share in value added is low. The country will have to accept slower 
growth for a relatively long time period in order to reduce its inflation and its wages level. 
Should this period be reflected in its potential growth?  
– If potential growth determinants depend on actual growth, potential growth may be 
evaluated by: * ( , , , )t t t t iY f t X Z Y −=  or by * ( , , , * )t t t t iY f t X Z Y −= . In the first case, 
potential output depends on actual output. In the second case, its trajectory may deviate 
from the current one for a long time. 
The link between potential growth and actual growth raises many issues. Basically, potential 
growth is exogenous and relatively regular: it is the sum of exogenous technical progress, 
trend growth of activity rates and working age population. In fact, in most empirical studies, 
potential growth fluctuates strongly in correlation with observed growth fluctuations. Either 
one admits that growth is effectively hit by exogenous productivity shocks, such that actual 
growth is potential growth. Either it is an artefact: the so-called potential growth 
fluctuations are the reversible outcome of actual growth fluctuations. Stronger demand 
induces stronger growth which induces larger capital accumulation, increases activity rates, 
attracts migrant workers, raises apparent labour productivity. An imperfect filtering of these 
effects induces potential growth estimates to fluctuate. The issue is especially acute after a 
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strong shock, such as the output fall in the years 2008-09. How to disentangle a permanent 
and irreversible effect from a temporary one? The diagnosis of a permanent effect may be 
self-fulfilling since it leads to assert that one should accept the output loss and therefore 
implement restrictive economic policy in a depression period.  
The standard method for estimating potential growth is the production function method. 
The maximum level of output which may be produced is determined by using the available 
production factors, i.e.: (1) 1* * ( * )N N DY A K U T H L
α α−=   
K is the effective capital stock. A fall in demand, leading to a fall in investment and a to a fall 
in the effective capital stock will lead unfortunately to a fall in measured potential output. 
This is arguable as productive investment will recover when demand increases. The cases 
where investment is constrained (for example by financial constraints) should be 
distinguished from the cases where investment can follow demand. The 2008 crisis has 
caused in some cases a specific obsolescence of capital (for example in the construction 
sector in Spain or in the financial sector in the UK), but this is difficult to take into account. 
The effect of the crisis on the cost of capital is problematic: interest rates decreased 
significantly, but this was probably not true for interest rates adjusted for risk, growth and 
inflation; the required rate of profit declined, but it was formerly obtained via fictitious 
financial gains. 
LD is the working-age population; in many EU countries (Spain, Ireland, the UK), there were 
large immigration flows before the crisis, which were reversed when the crisis started. The 
concept of available labour force becomes vague.  
HN is the trend in working time. It depends partly on economic policy decisions. 
TN is the participation rate trend; it is sensitive to the labour market situation. In a long-term 
perspective, the participation rate depends both on effective growth and social choices 
(such as the retirement age or female employment). How can this be taken into account? 
Will the future European economy choose to allow non-activity for dependant people, 
women with children, older workers) or will it be a full-activity society seeking to offset 
working-age population decelerating growth by immigration, retirement age postponement, 
shorter holidays, longer working time, etc.? 
U* represents the equilibrium (or structural) unemployment rate, which is of course difficult 
to estimate. Usually, an equation of the type: (2) *( )t t trulc U Uβ∆ = − − is estimated. The 
unemployment rate is above the equilibrium rate if real wages grow faster than labour 
productivity. But this is a descriptive method, which does not explain structural 
unemployment rate evolutions. But labour productivity strongly decelerates in times of 
crisis. When the unemployment rate is high, its fluctuations have little impact on real wage 
developments, and so according to this method an increase in the unemployment rate is an 
increase in structural unemployment. According to the hysteresis theory, the long-term 
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unemployed become progressively unemployable, so this effect would have theoretical 
justifications. The fact is that there is hardly any link between the theoretical justification 
and the estimation method. Conversely, however, the persistence of unemployment leads to 
a decrease in the reservation wage of unemployed workers, which should be favourable to 
employment. The irreversibility of this effect is problematic insofar as the so-called 
equilibrium unemployment decreases in job recoveries. Employability may be a problem for 
some workers, and this may increase after a depression period, but it is difficult to believe 
that these problems may be revealed by a single wage equation.  
A* stands for the total factor productivity (TFP) trend adjusted for the capacity utilisation 
rate. But the capacity utilisation is highly correlated with TFP variations which makes is 
uneasy to assess the trend. On the one hand A* decreases sharply in times of economic 
recession because firms are reluctant to lay-off workers; the extent to which the fall in A* is 
permanent is difficult to assess; on the other hand, one may consider that A* depends on 
the growth rate (the Kaldor-Verdoorn effect). Besides, in the medium term the TFP trend 
depends on companies’ R&D efforts, ad in the long-term of countries’ efforts in education, 
so that its exogenous nature is problematic. 
The alternative method consists in recognising implicitly that the capital stock is endogenous 
and to focus on the labour market:  
* *( * )N N DY PT U T H L=  
Assessing PT* raises the same issues as for A*, in the short like in the long term. In times of 
high unemployment, governments encourage firms to maintain jobs, in particular by specific 
cuts in employers’ social contributions, and so the apparent labour productivity growth 
trend is hindered. A company with strong output growth can more easily introduce 
innovations reducing the need for labour than a firm with stagnating demand, where these 
innovations would lead net employment to fall and consequently to layoffs.   
None of these two methods incorporates the effective constraints which limit output in a 
given period, such as: on the supply side, the external constraint, competitiveness, firms’ 
profitability or on the demand side, public balance or public debt or inadequacies in income 
distribution. These constraints could lead to specific definitions of potential output, which 
would then depend on the most significant constraint. 
After the 2008-09 crisis and the great depression, the potential growth approach raises three 
issues: 
– A choice needs to be made between two diagnoses: 1) pre-crisis growth was satisfactory, 
near full employment and without inflation in developed countries, 2) economies were 
overheating; growth was unbalanced. The output gap was strongly positive in 2007, but 
nobody noticed. 
– A choice needs to be made between two analyses:  1) There was a new downward break in 
TFP in 2009 coinciding by chance with the financial crisis (but this is difficult to prove as 
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long as the economy is far from normal rates of capacity utilisation and labour). 2) This 
break is due first to labour hoarding, and later to weak growth itself. 
– A choice needs to be made between two analyses:  1) potential output fell in the crisis 
because production capacities and skills became obsolete, because the rise in 
unemployment led to human capital permanent losses, because lower investment and 
innovation effort led to capital permanent losses. 2) The fall in demand led a fall in 
production and therefore production capacity and employment, but these falls can be 
reversed if demand recovers.  
The financial crisis led to permanent weaker demand; it is no longer possible for the growth 
regime to be driven by rising debt and financial and real estate bubbles; the fall in equity 
prices impoverished households and weakened the firms’ balance sheets; many households 
and businesses want to reduce their debts. Public finances deterioration paves the way for a 
prolonged period of fiscal austerity. The persistent weakness of demand necessarily 
translates into a persistent weakness of production, so of supply. Some see in this weakness 
a fall in potential output and growth. This seems to us a conceptual error. 
3. What estimates for potential output?  
3.1. Potential growth and the European Commission 
While the first version of the Stability Pact was essentially based on the 3% of GDP limit for 
the nominal public deficit, the reforms introduced since then increased the role of the 
structural deficit notion (and thus of potential output). Thus, Member States should now 
reach a medium-term target of 0.5% for their structural public deficit; as long as this 
objective is not achieved, they should improve their structural balance by at least 0.5% of 
GDP per year. However, the 3% limit remains for nominal deficits; breaching this arbitrary 
limit initiates the Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
These rules have no economic basis, as was already written many times (see, for instance, 
Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2006). These rules are much more rigid than the golden rule of 
public finances (which allows a structural deficit, corrected for public debt depreciation 
induced by inflation, equal to net public investment), and more rigid than the debt stability 
constraint. They prevent any discretionary stabilisation fiscal policy, although it is necessary 
for full stabilisation (see box 1, and Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2013). 
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Box 1: About fiscal rules 
In order to obtain a satisfactory demand level, the government must accept a public deficit. Let us 
note y, production, d, private demand, g, public demand, r is the interest rate and h the public 
debt/GDP ratio. All variables are measured in difference with a reference path where production is at 
its potential level.  
If y g d cy r khσ= + + − + , then the stabilisation fiscal policy is, in the short-run: g d rσ= − +  
If this policy is implemented, then stabilisation is perfect, there is no link ex post between the deficit 
and the output gap. Let us note also that, g, government borrowing, is considered as structural 
according to the OECD or the EC methods, which makes no sense.  
In the long run, g=0 and ( ) /h d r kσ= − −  
The long-term public debt level is not arbitrary, but depends on private agents’ wishes: debt must 
equal desired debt at the optimal interest rate, i.e. the rate equal to the growth rate.  
This simple model shows that a fiscal rule like: ( )g g y h hλ µ°= − − −  cannot be proposed, since it 
would not allow for full stabilisation and since the government cannot set a debt target regardless of 
private agents’ saving behaviour. The public debt level desired by private agents has probably 
increased during the crisis as households wish to hold less risky financial assets and businesses want 
to be less leveraged. Structurally, the ageing of populations implies that there is a rising demand for 
safe public assets.  
 
They have no economic rationale; they can only be understood for political reasons; their 
objective is to deprive Member States of fiscal policy autonomy; to impose an automatic 
fiscal regime, to concentrate macro-economic policies at the EC level. But the EC is unable to 
implement the differentiated and reactive fiscal policies that would be necessary according 
to each country’s economic situation. According to the ‘austerity/structural reforms' 
prevailing ideology at the EC, MS should reduce public spending and seek growth through 
goods and services markets deregulation and downsizing of labour laws; therefore, the EC 
does not have the objective of implementing effective fiscal policies. The January 2015 
Communication recognises that the requested cut in the structural deficit should depend on 
the MS economic situation. But the EC persists in refusing the implementation of any 
discretionary fiscal policies; the fiscal impulse should always be negative; in some extreme 
cases it could be zero, but never positive. The EC refuses the simple principle according to 
which: "each country should and must run the fiscal policy required to maintain its 
production at the potential level or to bring it back to it”.  
The devil is in the details: the crucial issue is the way of evaluating potential production. The 
Commission uses the production function method which leads to a fragile evaluation, which 
may be revised and is always close to the current production level. Let us look at the French 
case (table 1). In spring 2008, the output gap for 2007 was estimated to be slightly negative 
(-0.2 %). After the 2001-02 Internet crises, France experienced a weak growth period (1.6% 
average annual growth from 2000 to 2005). The French economy had recovered a 
satisfactory growth in 2006-07; the unemployment rate had fallen down to 8% in 2007. After 
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the 2008-09 crisis, the Commission entirely revises his assessment: the output gap is now 
estimated to have been strongly positive in 2007 (+3.1%); the French economy would have 
been overheating from 1999 to 2008; the output fall in 2009 is almost entirely a return to 
normal. The output gap is estimated at -2.2% for 2009. This is very awkward: over the 1999-
2007 period, inflation remained close to 2%; the wage share in value added remained stable 
(55.8% in 1999; 55.3% in 2007). There was no sign of overheating. Nevertheless, the revision 
done by the Commission reduces by 3.3% the potential output level in 2007 and increases by 
1.7 percentage point the structural public deficit (-2.4% in the 2008 estimate; -4.1% now).  
Table 1. French potential growth and output gap according to the EC 
  Spring 2008 Spring 2010 Spring 2012 Autumn 2014 
 GDP* potGDP* OG potGDP* OG potGDP* OG potGDP* OG 
2000 3.9 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.9 2.0 2.9 2.1 2.5 
2001 2.0 2.3 1.8 2.0 1.8 1.9 2.9 1.9 2.6 
2002 1.1 2.1 0.7 1.8 1.0 1.7 2.0 1.7 2.0 
2003 0.8 2.0 -0.2 1.8 0.3 1.8 1.1 1.7 1.1 
2004 2.8 2.0 0.3 1.8 0.9 1.9 1.6 1.8 2.1 
2005 1.6 2.0 0.0 1.9 1.0 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.8 
2006 2.4 1.9 0.1 1.8 1.4 1.9 2.3 1.7 2.5 
2007 2.4 2.1 -0.2 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.7 1.7 3.1 
2008 0.2 1.9 -0.5 1.6 0.8 1.6 1.1 1.6 1.7 
2009 -2.9   1.2 -2.7 1.2 -2.8 0.9 -2.2 
2010 2.0   1.3 -2.7 1.2 -2.5 1.1 -1.3 
2011 2.1    -2.3 1.3 -2.1 1.1 -0.4 
2012 0.3     1.2 -2.8 1.0 -1.0 
2013 0.3     1.2 -2.7 1.0 -1.7 
2014 0.3       0.9 -2.3 
*Growth rates, % 
Source: DG ECFIN, General government data. 
According to the Commission’s current estimates, French potential growth was already 
relatively low before the crisis: 1.7% in 2006-2007 (against 2% for the estimates made before 
the crisis); it fell sharply in 2009 and was since then of 1% only. The situation is worse for 
other countries, such as Greece, Spain and Portugal. Evaluations made before 2008 did not 
warn these countries against an excessive production level. Today, the Commission 
considers that potential growth became negative in Italy, Spain, Portugal and even more 
Greece (table 2). These evaluations have dramatic consequences in terms of the structural 
budgetary efforts that the countries concerned are expected to make. A potential growth of 
-1% instead of + 2% decreases by approximately 1.5 percent of GDP the estimated size of the 
structural effort. For a country where public spending represents around 50% of GDP, a 
structural effort of 0.5% of GDP is obtained with a 1% increase in public spending in volume 
by year, if annual potential growth is 2%;  a  2% cut by year is required if potential  growth is 
estimated to be -1%. 
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Table 2. Potential growth rates and output gaps according to the EC 
 Output gap 
2007 (2008 
estimation) 
Output gap 
2007 (2014 
estimation) 
Potential 
growth 2007 
(2008 
estimation) 
Potential 
growth  2007 
(2014 
estimation) 
Potential 
growth 2013 
(2014 
estimation) 
Output gap 
2014 (2014 
estimation) 
Belgium 0.3 2.7 2.5 1.8 0.7 -1.1 
Germany 0.7 1.9 1.4 1.3 1.3 -0 .8 
Ireland 0.2 4.7 5.2 3.1 0.9 -0.2 
Greece 1.5 4.7 3.8 1.9 -3.1 -10.9 
Spain -0.4 3.0 3.7 3.7 -0.7 -6.0 
France -0.2 3.1 2.1 1.7 1.0 -2.3 
Italy -0.3 2.4 1.5 0.8 -0.4 -4.5 
Netherlands 0.3 2.5 2.1 1.9 0.2 -3.0 
Austria 0.9 2.0 2.2 1.9 0.9 -1.1 
Portugal -1.1 0.9 1.3 1.2 -1.0 -6.0 
Slovenia 1.4 7.1 4.9 3.6 -0.2 -2.7 
Finland 0.8 4.6 3.4 1.6 -0.1 -3.1 
UK 0.4 2.1 2.7 1.9 1.0 -0.8 
*Growth rates, % 
Source: DG ECFIN, General government data. 
The Commission’s method, as it is applied today, is presented in European Economy (2014). 
The paper acknowledges the ambiguity of the concept: should capital stock be considered as 
fixed, knowing that it would increase in line with production? How to account for capital 
stock medium-term developments, which may follow production, but may also hit 
profitability or financial constraints? The paper recognizes that the EC method has 
institutional goals, and therefore should be simple, possibly at the detriment of pertinence. 
The paper considers potential growth should be equal on average to actual production, but 
this is questionable for an area which has experienced a prolonged depression and strong 
disinflation. Potential production is estimated according to the production function method 
(equation 1) with the already reported drawbacks. Immigration impacts past potential 
output, not the future one. The unemployment rate, estimated by equation (2), follows 
roughly the effective unemployment rate fluctuations, and is not explained by structural 
factors. For Spain, the structural unemployment rate would have declined from 17% in 1992 
to 12% in 2005, before rising to 26% in 2015. In some countries, β  is not significant.  
At Year N, potential output must be extrapolated for years N+1, N+2. This is done using the 
Commission’s projections figures, which necessarily fluctuate widely and are uncertain. 
Filtering methods to assess productivity growth trends are particularly fragile for the end of 
the period. Thus, potential production and structural balance estimates are particularly 
uncertain for the periods where the assessment given by the European Institutions on 
national fiscal policies is central3. 
                                                          
3 The use of structural public balances as evaluated by the European commission to analyze and guide the MS 
fiscal policy is also criticized by Hers and Suyker (2014). 
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For medium-term forecasts, the method becomes more pragmatic, ideological and political: 
the evolution of the structural unemployment rate accounts for structural indicators (such as 
the unemployment benefit replacement ratio, the weight of labour taxation, the 
unionization rate…), without any empirical evidence.  The evolution of participation rates 
partly reflects changes in pensions’ legislation. The EC paper gives no explanation for the 
revisions induced by the crisis and for the unrealistic results of the 2000-07 period. 
As table 3 shows, the strong slowdown in potential growth, according to the Commission, is 
induced by the decline in capital accumulation (induced in fact by the output fall itself) and 
by labour contribution, which comes partly from the reversal of migration flows, partly 
because of an alleged increase in the NAWRU (8.8% in 2008, 10.2 % in 2015), despite all 
labour market reforms. The slowdown in TFP growth is a long-term phenomenon: it 
decreases from 1.5% in 1985-1992 to 0.9% in 1997-2002, and 0.65 per cent in 2003-2007 
and would be 0.5% in 2015-18, despite all structural reforms. 
Table 3. Potential growth and contributions according to the Commission 
EA 18 Potential growth TFP 
Capital 
contribution 
Labour 
contribution 
2003-2007 1.8 0.65 0.8 0.35 
2009-2014 0.6 0.4 0.3 -0.1 
2015-2018 0.95 0.5 0.4 0.05 
2019-2023 1.3 0.6 0.45 0.25 
Source: European Economy (2014). 
Four conclusions may be drawn from these considerations. The potential growth concept 
used by the Commission cannot take into account supply constraints faced by a MS. This is 
obvious from the estimates made for Greece, Spain, and Ireland before the crisis. If growth 
was unbalanced in these countries, these imbalances are not reflected in terms of deviation 
from potential growth. 
The Commission has no explicit theories explaining why potential growth slowed down in 
2008-09 and why it is so low now. It does not disentangle cyclical and structural 
developments. This is also true in the recent past. For instance, the UK potential growth 
estimate had fallen to an annual 0.9% in 2010, and has risen back to 2% in the following 
years. The potential output constraint drifts away as observed GDP comes close to it. 
The potential growth notion and its use for economic policy are clearly undermined by these 
drawbacks. Either potential growth is independent from effective growth, and if so it is 
difficult to understand why the Commission lowered it so much after the crisis; or potential 
growth depends on effective growth: a recession causes investment to fall, and hence to 
lower production capacity; potential labour force decreases (since some workers are 
discouraged to find a job, particularly among older-people, young people, women with 
children; since migration flows are reversed); labour productivity growth decelerates due to 
labour hoarding. But should this lead to conclude that potential output is permanently lower 
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and that any strong increase in demand should be avoided in the future, or, in the contrary, 
that strong growth is needed to increase production capacity, to bring discouraged workers 
back to the labour market and to avoid a deterioration in their working skills? 
The EC-DG ECFIN estimates cannot be used to set targets or limit public deficits, because 
they are volatile and unreliable. A more robust method resulting in a more stable potential 
growth would be necessary. It would either lead to the conclusion that fiscal policies should 
have been significantly more expansionary in the euro area or it would have to specify the 
reasons why expansionary fiscal policies would be irrelevant (such as current account 
imbalances). 
It makes no sense to request a country to implement a restrictive fiscal policy in order to 
meet an arbitrary public finance target if this country has high unemployment and low and 
decelerating inflation. The output gap could serve as a guide for economic policy with a rule 
such as: “a country is allowed to run an expansionary policy if its output gap is negative”. But 
this is not what is written in the Fiscal Compact. The issue of the relevance of output gap 
estimates remains. 
3.2. Potential growth and international institutions 
The OECD and the IMF use similar methods as those of the Commission, with similar results 
(table 4). Spanish and Greek imbalances are not detected before the crisis; after the crisis, 
pre-crisis output gaps are strongly revised upwards; potential growth becomes nil or even 
negative in Spain and in Greece. 
Table 4. Output gaps and potential growth, according to the EC, OECD, and IMF  
In % 
 OG 2007 
(2008 
estimate) 
OG 2007 
(2014 
estimate) 
Potential 
growth, 2007 
(2008 
estimate) 
Potential 
growth, 2007 
(2014 
estimate) 
Potential 
growth, 2013 
(2014 
estimate) 
OG 2014 
(2014 
estimate) 
Greece        
EC 1.5  4.7 3.8 1.9 -3.1 -10.9 
OECD 0.7  9.5 3.8 0.7 -1.4 -12.7 
IMF - 10.0 - 0.5 -1.8  -9.4 
Spain       
EC -0.4  3.0 3.7 3.7 -0.7  -6.0 
OECD 0.3  4.6 3.4 2.6 0.4  -6.1 
IMF 0.3  2.7 3.5 2.8 -0.2  -5.0 
France       
CE -0.2  3.1 2.1 1.7 1.0  -2.3 
OECD 0.3  3.0 1.9 1.5 1.3  -2.2 
IMF -0.5  2.1 2.1 1.6 1.2  -2.8 
Source: European Economy (2008, 2014), OECD Economic outlook (2008, 2014), IMF World Economic outlook (2008, 2014). 
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Using the OECD method and data, Furceri and Mourougane (2012) find that a financial crisis 
has a permanent impact on potential production of 1.5 to 2.4% (3.8% for a strong crisis). But 
a substantial part of the effect comes from the decrease in the capital stock, so that one can 
hardly disentangle the supply effect and the demand effect.  
In April 2015, an IMF study (IMF, 2015) distinguishes the notion of potential output from the 
notion of sustainable output (which would take into account all imbalances), but the latter is 
not estimated. Potential output is measured by a two-equation model, which has the 
weakness to be based on the Phillips curve linearity: 
( *)
* ( *)
e
y
a c U U e
U U Y Y e
ππ π
τ
= + − − +
− = − +
 
In developed countries, TFP growth would have decelerated before the 2008 crisis due to 
the waning of ICT effects and to the growth of low productivity sectors (personal services, 
construction, non-market services). The IMF considers that the crisis has been accompanied 
by a sharp slowdown in potential growth (especially in the euro area, from 1.5% by year to 
0.7% in 2008-2014). On the whole, the crisis would have reduced potential output in the 
euro area by 7.75% in 2014. The study distinguishes permanent effects (the slowdown in 
potential labour force growth) from temporary effects (slowdowns of capital accumulation 
and TFP growth, increase in the rate of structural unemployment, decline in the participation 
rate, which should theoretically be reversible, but seem empirically to have lasting effects on 
levels as on growth rates). However, a large part of these effects reflects a strong pessimism 
about the pace of future growth. Low growth anticipations lead to a decrease in the rate of 
capital accumulation and of potential labour force. The IMF study concludes that potential 
growth should be increased by supporting productive investment, and investments in 
infrastructure, by increasing the use of ICT and by reforming the tax and social systems to 
encourage female and older workers’ employment.  
Ball (2014) considers that potential output revisions made by the OECD and the IMF 
between their assessments of December 2007 and May 2014 effectively reflect the impact 
of the crisis on potential output, without questioning the evaluation methods at all. Ball 
points that both institutions made similar revisions: -35% for Greece and Ireland (but was 
pre-crisis growth sustainable in these two countries?); -30% for Hungary; -22% for Spain and 
the Czech Republic; -19% for Finland; - 14% for the Portugal; -12% for Italy and the UK; - 
9.5% for Japan; -8.5% for France; -5.5% for the US; - 3.5% for Germany. Ball offers the usual 
explanations (reduction of capital accumulation, innovations brakes), but questions neither 
the potential growth concept, nor the evaluation methods. 
Ollivaud and Turner (2014) also try to estimate the impact of the financial crisis on OECD 
countries’ potential output. They distinguish the impact on the capital per worker ratio, on 
labour productivity, on structural unemployment rate and on activity rates. According to 
them, a large part of the slowdown in growth since 2007 is due to the output gap (very 
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positive in 2007, very negative in 2014). The effect of the crisis on potential output would be 
+3.9% in Germany (due to higher rates of activity and decline in structural unemployment), + 
1.1% in France (due to the increase in the rate of activity), -2.5% in the US, -8.0% in Spain 
(due to the increase in the structural unemployment rate), -8.6% in Britain (due to lower 
labour productivity) and up to -22.7% in Greece. In our view, the study is unconvincing 
because it does not allow to disentangle the effect of the crisis itself from the effect of other 
variables (restrictive fiscal policies, pensions or labour laws reforms, cyclical developments) 
or poorly explained phenomena (the sharp slowdown of productivity in the UK). 
In a recent paper, the DG ECFIN (Commission, 2015 b) claims that its method performed 
better than HP filter, OECD and IMF methods. The fact is that all four methods have a poor 
performance. We can make three objections. Assessing the performance of a method by 
confronting its real time evaluation with the EC current one is more than problematic, as the 
EC current method is as (more ?) problematic  than the real time one.  We cannot accept the 
thesis according to which the break in growth in 2008-09 is structural, an evidence according 
to which the output gap was strongly positive in 2007 as the break comes from a financial 
crisis prolonged by a European-imposed fiscal austerity policy. The EC evaluations are self-
fulfilling: an evaluation of slow potential growth obliges MS to implement austerity fiscal 
policy, which induces a slow growth, which the paper uses as an evidence that potential 
growth was effectively weak. 
3.3. The introduction of financial variables  
Borio et al. (2013, 2014) notice that, over the last three decades, price fluctuations poorly 
reflect output fluctuations in developed countries. But financial variables (credit growth rate, 
housing prices, real interest rate) play an important role in the dynamics of demand and 
supply: in times of financial booms, demand is risen, and this also holds for investment. This 
can be accompanied by exchange rate appreciation which reduces inflation. On the contrary, 
a stock market crash reduces demand, but also strengthens firms’ financial constraints, 
which is detrimental to capital accumulation. This leads the authors to introduce financial 
variables in a model explaining the output gap. With φ financial variables, the model is 
written as:  
(3)        
1
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For 2000-2012 period, such a model has the advantage of inducing a positive output gap 
before the crisis and a negative one since then. But while the model allows to assess a 
potential growth series, it does not explain its determinants. It includes no variable 
representing tensions on supply. The model does not include factors driving the economic 
cycle other than financial variables. It is based on the arguable assumption according to 
which production equals potential output when financial variables are at their average value.  
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The model can be generalized by introducing other cyclical variables ( )tϕ  as such as the 
fiscal impulse, the real exchange rate, or oil price shocks: 
1 1* ( *)t t t t t t ty y y yβ γφ δϕ η− −− = − + + +  
But this remains a descriptive (and not explanatory) model of potential growth. Above all, 
the model relies on a non-demonstrated postulate: demand equals potential production, in 
the absence of external, financial, and economic policy shocks. 
3.4. Empirical studies on the impact of the crisis on potential growth 
Haltmaier (2012) asks: “Do Recessions Affect Potential Growth?". In our view, the answer is 
yes, if potential output is measured according to international institutions’ methods (where 
potential output is affected by the slowdown in investment and rising unemployment); the 
answer is no, by definition, if potential output is corrected for cyclical effects. However, the 
recession may not be cyclical; it may signal the end of a period of unbalanced growth: so the 
question is ambiguous. In fact, the empirical study concludes that recessions have a negative 
impact of 2% on average on potential output in developed countries; the impact depends on 
the depth of the recession, but not on its financial characteristics. The author concludes that 
the actual recession would cost 3 percent of potential GDP for developed countries, which is 
relatively small given the observed slowdown. 
For Fernald (2014), the United States experienced a period of strong labour productivity 
gains from 1996 to 2005, due to the industries producing or using ICT. The period has ended, 
and consequently potential growth has slowed down in the United States, but the author 
acknowledges that it is still difficult to distinguish this effect from the fall in demand induced 
by the burst of the financial bubble. 
3.5. Potential growth:  two studies from INSEE 
On a medium-term horizon, Cabannes, Montaut and Pionnier (2013) provide an evaluation 
of French potential growth from 2015 to 2025. Potential growth would stand between 1.2% 
and 1.9% by year, 1.5% in the central scenario, decomposed as: 0.5% for labour contribution, 
0.5% for capital contribution and 0.5% of pure TFP.  However, the paper does not say what 
the output gap level was in 2013. Similarly, it does not explain the link between actual and 
potential growth. Stronger demand entails faster capital accumulation, encourages some 
people to enter (or to remain) on the labour market, authorizes larger immigration flows, 
allows to possibly increase working time and to postpose the retirement age. The two key 
issues are not addressed: what are the actual barriers to growth? Do we want higher growth 
at any cost? 
The paper by Lequien and Montant (2014) defines potential GDP as the "GDP level which 
would be obtained if production factors (labour and capital) were used to a maximal extent 
without any tensions on prices", thus introducing a questionable symmetry between labour 
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and capital. Four methods are confronted. The paper concludes that potential growth ranges 
between 0.7% and 1.3% in 2014 (compared with 2% before the crisis), the output gap in 
2014 ranging between-2.3 and-3.5 points, 70% of the output loss due to the crisis would be 
permanent. 
The first method uses the production function. The capital stock is exogenous. The structural 
unemployment rate is calculated according to the equation: 1 ( *)a b c U U eπ π −= + − − + . It 
rises from 8.6% in 2007 to 9.5% in 2013, i.e. is only one percentage point below the effective 
rate. The TFP falls from 1% before the crisis to 0 afterwards. This induces a sharp slowdown 
of potential growth from 2.1% to 0.6% per year. This method signals but does not explain 
the slowdown in potential growth. 
Table 5. French potential growth and output gaps according  
to Lequien and Montant (2014) 
Method PG 2000-06 PG 2008-13 OG 2007 OG 2013 
Production function 2.1 0.6 0.9 -2.3 
Labour market 2.0  0.75 0.8 -3.2 
Semi-Structural 2.0  0.95 1.5 -3.5 
Direct  1.85 0.7 0.7 -2.9 
EC 1.8  1.15 3.4 -2.7 
OECD 1.8 1.2 3.6 -2.9 
IMF 2.0 0.9 2.5 -2.4 
 
The second method is based on labour market developments. It allows not to incorporate 
the capital accumulation slowdown in the evaluation of potential growth. Potential growth 
depends on labour productivity trend, estimated to grow by 1.1% by year in normal times. 
Unfortunately, a questionable method leads to labour productivity structural growth of -
0.5% in 2009-10. Should the gap (of around 3%) and labour hoarding during the great 
depression, be deducted from potential growth (as done by the authors) or will it disappear? 
Potential labour force grows by 0.2% only per year because of the rise in the equilibrium 
unemployment rate. Finally, the potential growth rate would return to around 1.3% in 2014. 
The semi-structural approach uses information on the capacity utilisation rate, on inflation, 
on the business climate, to evaluate the output gap, potential GDP being the sum of the 
output gap and of the actual GDP. This method is questionable: the capacity utilisation rate 
may return to normal levels after a prolonged period of recession, as firms do not have any 
reason to maintain excessive production capacity. This does not mean that production is at 
its potential level from the labour market perspective; unemployment fluctuations have no 
impact on inflation when unemployment is high and inflation already low. So, there is a risk 
that the method underestimates the output gap. Here also, the method is purely descriptive. 
The so-called direct approach uses a large number of short-term indicators to build a 
synthetic indicator representing the economic cycle. The output gap evaluation method 
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consists in standardizing the synthetic indicator using the mean and the standard deviation 
of the output gap assessed under the first method, which has no justification: the method is 
not autonomous. Since 2008, the economic situation has deviated from usual cyclical 
fluctuations. This method leads to unstable potential growth estimates, since it adds 
effective growth to the output gap evaluated by the method (2.3% in 2002, 1.5% in 2003, 
and 2.6% in 2004, for example). 
3.6. Potential growth: three studies from the Banque de France 
The paper by Chetouane, Lemoine and de la Serve (2011) described a slowdown in French 
potential growth from 1.7% in 2007 to 0.7% in 2012, due to a decline in TFP growth (from 
0.3% to 0.2%), the lowering of capital accumulation (from 0.9% to 0.6%) and even more to 
the decline in labour contribution (from 0.4% to -0.1%), due to an increase in the structural 
unemployment rate and a decline in the participation rate. But the method provides no 
explanatory factors. With regard to the labour market, the rise in the structural 
unemployment rate is due to the fact that the rise in unemployment has not induced a 
sufficient significant slowdown in inflation, but this could perhaps also be explained by non-
linearity in the Phillips curve. 
The paper by Chouard, Castro, Irac and Lemoine (2014) estimates an equation explaining TFP 
growth. Apart from trends and dummy variables, the only explanatory variables are the 
average age of capital and the capacity utilization rate. The paper concludes that the crisis 
induced permanent (although gradual) losses in the factors productivity level by 6.2% (3.3% 
being a direct effect, 2.9% the effect induced by the increase in the age of capital). The crisis 
has no effect on TFP growth (which remains at 1%). The increase in the age of capital is not 
obvious if firms, during low demand periods, use only the latest equipment. In this approach, 
potential production was hit by a negative shock in the crisis, which contradicts the usual 
method of long-term trends obtained by filtering. 
Bank of France (2015) writes that potential output and potential growth are theoretical 
variables, which are is complex to identify. "Growth may be unsustainable even without 
imbalances in the real economy, in the case of major imbalances in the financial sphere". 
The text calls for a "production function with crisis" method, incorporating a break of TFP in 
level. The text suggests the loss of employability of the long-term unemployed, the 
mismatch between jobs demand and supply, capital inadequacy, the decline in investment. 
For France, the Bank of France takes the view of a positive output gap from 1999 to 2007, 
followed by a potential growth of 1% by year, resulting in an output gap of -2.2% in 2013-
2014. 
3.7. Potential growth: three points of view from OFCE 
Insofar as it is difficult to estimate an equilibrium unemployment rate, insofar as there is no 
reason why capital stock fluctuations should be incorporated in potential output estimates, 
some OFCE economists have kept an empirical practice which consists in estimating that the 
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equilibrium unemployment rate was achieved in 2006-07; then to prolong potential output 
according to labour force expected developments, trends in activity rates, and apparent 
labour productivity growth. The working age (15-65) population growth would decelerate 
from 0.8% per year in 2006 to 0.4 per cent in 2015, but the activity rate would increase by 
0.2% per year due to women and older people; labour productivity would continue to grow 
by 1% per year. In such conditions, the output gap would have been in the order of -6% in 
2010; -10% in 2014 (table 6, columns 2 and 3). This large gap is reflected in 2014, both in a 
high rate of unemployment, a fall in activity rates as compared to their trend, a decline in 
labour productivity growth (due to labour hoarding and to the Kaldor-Verdoorn effect), 
which could be reversed. According to this point of view, it is difficult to assess potential 
output (if this concept makes sense) in times of economic depression, insofar as a strong 
increase in demand would increase production factors levels, also because of non-linearity 
of wages and prices equations in times of large excess in supply. 
Table 6. French potential growth estimates, in % 
  Trend Compromise Break 
 GDP 
growth 
Potential 
growth 
OG Potential 
growth 
OG Potential 
growth 
OG 
2006 2.4 2.0 0 2.0 0 2.0 0.0 
2007 2.4 1.9 0.5 1.9 0.5 1.9 0.5 
2008 0.2 1.9 -1.2 1.9 -1.2 1.4 -0.7 
2009 -2.9 1.9 -6.0 1.4-3.0 -2.5 1.4-3.0 -2.0 
2010 2.0 1.8 -5.8 1.4 -2.1 1.0 -1.0 
2011 2.1 1.8 -5.5 1.4 -1.7 1.0 0.1 
2012 0.3 1.7 -6.9 1.4 -2.8 1.0 -0.6 
2013 0.3 1.7 -8.3 1.4 -3.9 1.0 -1.3 
2014 0.3 1.6 -9.6 1.4 -4.4 1.0 -2.0 
2015 1.2 1.6 -10.0 1.4 -5.4 1.0 -2.0 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
In December 2011, OFCE’s forecast is based on a negative output gap of 5% for 2011. It 
assumes that this gap will be closed in 2 years, so that spontaneous growth for the next two 
years would be around 4%. In December 2012, the forecast is based on an output gap of - 
6% for 2012. The assumption then is that the output gap will close by 1.5% per year at 
maximum, so that spontaneous growth would be 3.2% per year, during 4 years. In spring 
2013, the forecast opts for an intermediate scenario, with a break in potential production of 
around 3% at the beginning of the crisis and a potential growth of 1.4% since then. The 
output gap would be around -4% in 2013. A spontaneous growth of 2.6% would close the 
gap in 3 years. At the same time, a study by Cochard et al. (2013) shows that the output gap 
widened by 6.5 percentage points from 2007 to 2012, by examining the deviations in 
unemployment rate, activity rate and labour productivity with their trends. In the autumn 
2014, the forecast comes closer to conventional estimates (chart 1). It accepts the idea of a 
positive output gap from 1999 to 2008. The output gap is about -2% in 2012, -3% in 2013. 
But the authors suggest a potential for spontaneous growth of 2.4% from 2010 to 2014.  
20 
 
Should we accept a positive output gap from 1999 to 2007? Should potential growth be 
slowed down when actual growth is low? This is probably for the sake of credibility, but this 
undermines the usefulness of the potential growth concept.  Was there a break in potential 
production in 2009? This implies to consider that the fall in demand translates into 
permanent and irreversible losses in terms of equilibrium unemployment rates and labour 
productivity growth. 
Chart. Autumn 2014 estimates 
 
Source: OFCE 
The analysis is often based on the unproven implicit assumption that production 
automatically returns to its potential level, or at a rate of x percentage points per year, or in 
n years, so that forecasts may rely on the notion of spontaneous growth. If n = 3, an output 
gap of -4% and a potential growth of 1.4% imply a spontaneous growth of 2.7%. If x = 1.5%, 
spontaneous growth is 2.9%. But this assumes that the output gap and potential growth can 
be defined and measured without ambiguity, which is wrong. It also implies that there are 
spontaneous forces to return to the equilibrium. These mechanisms should be clarified: in 
the euro area, this can hardly be through a decline in real interest rates adjusted for growth, 
or through competitiveness gains. Deflation is slow and its effects can be both positive 
(increases in households’ real incomes, real wealth effects) and negative (increases in debt 
ratio). Unemployment certainly leads real wages to decrease, but here also the effects are 
ambiguous. Finally, fiscal policy may be forced to become pro-cyclical. 
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In a recent work, Heyer and Timbeau (2015) estimate potential growth for France using the 
method described by Borio et al. (2013, see equation 3). Observed production departs from 
potential output due to financial shocks (interest rates, stock prices), external shocks (oil 
price), fiscal impulses, the average output gap of the French trade partners, the 
competitiveness level and the real estate prices level. It tends to come back to it 
automatically. According to the econometric estimation, French potential growth was 1.85% 
by year from 1982 to 2014; the output gap was - 4.5% in 2014; 7% of the output gap would 
be automatically filled every quarter. However, this method does not allow to explain or 
even to describe potential growth developments; the foreign countries’ output gap is 
measured by the OECD method, which makes the estimation inconsistent; the mechanism 
which would allow to return to potential growth is not explained; tensions on supply are 
omitted (inflation, firms profitability); private demand fluctuations are not taken in account. 
Let us imagine, using the model in box 1, that private demand falls by 1, the Government 
responds with a fiscal impulse of 1, production remains at its potential level, so that the 
fiscal impulse seems to have no impact. This method therefore underestimates the fiscal 
multiplier (which is evaluated to be 0.6). 
3.8. Potential growth and the French government 
The French government must include in the documents sent to European Institutions an 
assessment of potential output and potential growth, a strange operation which combines 
economic science and political compromises. 
At the end of 2013, the Government estimates that the output gap for 2012 is -2% and that 
potential growth for the next 5 years is 1.5%. This -2% is amazing since France lost 7% of 
growth compared to the pre-crisis trend. As compared to 2007, the loss is 2.5% in terms of 
unemployment rate, 3.5% in terms of labour productivity, 1% in terms of participation rates.  
With a negative output gap of 7%, France could say that no additional fiscal effort should be 
made (especially as a structural deficit of 2% of GDP stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio at 60%, 
or to meet the true "golden rule of public finances”), but France did not wish to get into 
conflict with the Commission 
At the end of 2014, the Government accepts the Commission's figures. The output gap was 
only -2.7% in 2013. Potential growth is 1% in 2013-15, 1.2% in 2016-18. Compared with a 
potential growth of 1.6 per cent, this requires an additional fiscal effort of 0.25% per year in 
2013-2015. 
To conclude, the review of these different studies leads to rather negative conclusions. It is 
not credible to find a positive output gap in France like in the Euro area from 1999 to 2007; it 
is strange that potential growth estimates have been so substantially revised ex post after 
the 2008-09 crisis. Studies generally show a decrease in potential output in 2009, a break in 
potential growth, but do not explain them. One may think that when the fall in output is 
large, potential output is not measurable. One should clearly choose between three points 
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of view: 1) potential output is a short-term concept, it reflects actual production 
developments; it cannot be used to measure and guide economic policy. 2) It is a long-term 
concept which reflects pure supply constraints, it does not vary with demand-driven 
production fluctuations. 3) The potential production concept accounts for all constraints that 
weigh on the economy (factors availability, firms’ profitability, solvency of public finances, 
competitiveness), which makes the calculation method much more demanding.  
4. What potential growth in the future?  
At mid-2015, two views can be opposed. For the European Commission, the IMF, the OECD, 
for many economists (for instance, CAE, 2014, OECD, 2014a, IMF, 2015), the substantial 
slowdown in potential growth they believe to have seen since 2009 will last in the future, 
and the issue of potential growth is crucial already today because of the ageing of 
populations (which reduce labour force growth), the slowdown in capital accumulation and 
the slowdown in TFP growth. 
Future TFP growth is of course an issue: it will slow down under the effects of environmental 
constraints, rising raw materials and energy prices; ICT innovations should speed it up, but as 
demonstrated by Gordon (2012, 2014) and Fernald (2014), their effects on overall 
productivity appear to be less and less substantial. According to Gordon, the same applies to 
efforts in education. If annual potential growth in the euro area is spontaneously no more 
than 1% in the coming years, if the objective of public debt reduction to 60% of GDP is 
maintained, while social spending (health, pensions) are on a rising trend, the euro area 
would have no choice but cut strongly public spending. So, the priority should be to increase 
potential growth by structural reforms, to deregulate goods and labour markets, by 
education and research efforts, by firms’ incentives for innovation and R & D, by incentives 
for labour market participation of women and older workers, by fiscal consolidation and 
drastic cuts in public expenditure (OECD, 2014). 
However, recent experience has shown that fiscal consolidation strategies, generalised at 
the euro area level, are very costly in terms of growth and not effective in terms of debt-to-
GDP ratios. The recommended policy would include substantial transfers in favour of 
companies, and at the expense of households (tax and social contributions cuts funded by 
lower public spending and benefits, wage cuts for unskilled workers in the services sector). It 
would be socially costly; it would lead demand to fall in the short term; it would be 
uncooperative in Europe where each country should reduce domestic demand and wages. It 
is somewhat hypocritical to claim to safeguard the European social model by strongly 
reducing social spending.   
Besides, measuring TFP is problematic (Mokyr, 2014). How to integrate the dematerialization 
and free access permitted by Internet? 
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More fundamentally, with this strategy, developed economies would be sentenced to a 
perpetual search for growth and innovation, with no reflection on the growth content.  
Should we encourage the largest number of people to keep market sector jobs as long as 
they can, when mechanization/computerization tends to make them disappear, without 
questioning even the content of these jobs? No social control of innovation and of growth 
content would be desirable or even possible. The society should rely on entrepreneurs. This 
search for growth would end, one day, in an ecological catastrophe. 
Several studies claim to evaluate the gains that a set of structural reforms could bring. Their 
point of view is often to deny all positive aspects of regulation, as well as public and social 
expenditure and to consider that any move towards a hypothetical pure market economy 
liberalism would increase growth. Thus, the OECD (2014 b) estimates the potential gain for 
France at 3.7% after 10 years. This figure may seem high; it should, however, be compared 
with the 10% loss that the crisis cost France. The study is considering no reform of the 
banking and financial system, responsible for the crisis; the issues of poor euro area 
governance, the break-up of the French industrial model, or ecological transition are not 
discussed. The reforms are essentially limited to increase competition in the energy sector 
(but are lower energy prices compatible with energy transition?) and in regulated 
professions (but should France facilitate the development judiciary professions?); to reform 
unemployment insurance (but the French problem is the lack of jobs, not the reluctance of 
workers to get a job). 
According to a study by the European Commission (Varga and In 't Veld, 2014), structural 
reforms could increase GDP in the euro area (France) by 6.3% (7.7%) in 10 years. But some 
proposals are difficult to implement in high unemployment situation. For instance, the rise in 
the participation rate of women, low-skilled workers, elderly people, would increase GDP by 
2.3% in the case of France, but how would these people find a job?; same problem for the 
unemployment benefits reform (+0.8% of GDP). Other reforms need a very long time, such 
as the increase in the share of high-skilled workers and the decrease in the share of low-
skilled workers (+0.9% of GDP). Some are economically and socially questionable: raising 
consumption taxation while lowering labour taxation, would increase GDP by + 1.7% 
according to the EC, but it would be neutral, according to us, unless wage and social benefits 
indexation were abolished (Sterdyniak, 2015). 
The collection of papers on secular stagnation (Teulings and Baldwin, 2014) shows that 
problems are similar in the US and in the EU. Most economists, such as Gordon (2014) or Lo 
and Rogoff (2015), mix supply arguments (potential growth will decelerate due to the 
waning of technical progress, the slowing down of innovation and the ageing of populations) 
and demand ones (growth in inequalities, private and public debts). According to Summers 
(2014), the world economy suffers from an excess of savings over investment, it cannot be 
managed by monetary policy, given the zero lower bond for nominal interest rates; secular 
stagnation is inevitable. Many advocate for liberal structural reforms to promote growth at 
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any cost. Most recognize the responsibility of increasing inequalities and financialization in 
the current crisis, but refuse to question the neo-liberal model. Very few advocate a 
redistributive taxation, the development of social protection and pas-as-you-go retirement 
schemes (to minimise the financialization induced by pension funds). No one calls into 
question the multinational firms’ strategy of producing in countries with low wages and 
putting pressure on wages in developed countries.   
According to us, the European economy is currently far from its potential output, as shown 
by the threats of disinflation and the low level of interest rates. The financial crisis led to a 
fall in demand, the public debt crisis in Southern countries, austerity fiscal policies provoked 
a surge of unemployment, a stagnation (and sometimes a decrease) in activity rates 
(especially for the young and for women), a decrease in labour productivity growth due to 
labour hoarding, to the Kaldor-Verdoorn effect, to the low-skilled employment incentive 
policy.  At firms’ level, labour-saving innovations are difficult to introduce in a stagnation 
period. It is difficult to know what the potential output level would be after a strong rise in 
demand.  
Europe suffers from four related problems: 
– Trade globalization (which allows to produce in emerging countries) like financial 
globalization (which allows to choose between productive and financial investment) 
increased the profitability required by firms. At the same time firms invest less in Europe 
because of the growth slowdown and of investment in emerging countries. The relative price 
of capital goods decreases when services sectors develop, where capital needs are limited. 
– A significant part of the population saw its industrial jobs disappear as a result of both 
mechanization/computerization and competition from emerging countries. Conversely, a 
very small share of the population benefits from globalization. Large companies and wealthy 
people can increasingly be exempt from the public expenditure burden. Their share in 
wealth increases while their savings rate is high. There is a substantial difference between 
the income distribution resulting from current power relations between capital and labour, 
and competition between countries and the one which would be required to allow a 
balanced growth. 
– The resulting demand deficit has been filled in by financial bubbles and households’ 
indebtedness (the Anglo-Saxon solution), by competitiveness gains (the German strategy), or 
by public debt. After the burst of the financial bubble, after the public debt crisis in Southern 
countries, after the Fiscal Compact, Europe suffers from a lack of demand and excessive 
competitiveness in Northern countries, in particular in Germany. 
– The lack of demand requires an expansionary monetary policy. Short-term interest rates 
have been brought down to zero, but this remains insufficient in light of the weakness of 
demand and of low-inflation prospects (Summers, 2014). There is a risk in developed 
countries of a fragile recovery relying on financial bubbles or over-indebtedness. 
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According to this point of view, the current problem is not potential growth but the capacity 
to grow at a sufficient rate to use all available labour, taking into account constraints 
imposed by globalization and financial capitalism. The relevant policy should include a 
decrease in the profitability requested by firms and financial markets, the increase in wage 
share in enterprises value added, in particular in Northern Europe countries; the end of tax 
competition to attract richest people and large firms;  supporting ecological investment, via 
public spending, but even more by the banking and financial sector, cleared of speculation, 
an industrial policy aiming at redefining the place of Europe in future labour international 
division, the development of the European social model. Fiscal policies should renounce to 
set arbitrary targets in terms of government balance or debt. Monetary policy should 
maintain low interest rates as long as necessary, but be accompanied by a macro-prudential 
supervision to avoid speculative bubbles. Today, this policy is a utopia, in view of the political 
situation in Europe.  
The issue of trends in productivity growth, the measure of which is largely a statistical 
convention, has little importance after all. It is difficult to evaluate what would be the TFP 
trend in the euro area nearer full-employment, with stronger demand, where firms would be 
encouraged to save labour, energy, and avoid ecological damages. Europe may, in the years 
to come, if it wishes to do so, raise women and older workers participation rates, reduce 
involuntary part-time jobs, increase the number of immigrant workers. There is no evidence 
today that potential growth will be an effective constraint in a medium-term future. 
However, the question is whether, accounting for the already achieved GDP level and 
ecological constraints, EU countries should aim at reaching the highest growth and market-
sector employment possible or whether the objective should not be to account for the 
needed limitation of material production growth and to see how our societies may adapt to 
it. 
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